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Have banks filled the gap?  
Credit as a mechanism of corporate governance in a transition 
country: example of Poland 
 
 
 
Abstract:  
Poland, as any other transition country, suffers from inefficient corporate 
governance as firms have difficulties with obtaining external financing. This paper 
aims to examine whether bank’s involvement in corporate control reduces information 
asymmetries, and hence lessens firm’s financial constraints – phenomenon frequently 
measured by investment-cash flow sensitivity.  In the sample of all non-financial 
companies listed during 1999-2002 on the Polish stock exchange firms with a close 
relationship with banks are almost as much financially constrained as firms without 
such ties. However, the former group relies more heavily on bank loans than on internal 
capital in their investment activities. In contrast, firms without a close relationship with 
banks finance to larger extent their investment with internal capital than with credit. It 
may be interpreted that bank loans are more important source of financing for firms 
with bank ties than for firms without bank ties.   
 
 
Key words: corporate control and governance, firm financing, relationship banking, 
emerging markets
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1. Introduction  
When the transition process began in post-communist economies, the state had 
withdrawn from corporate governance and a gap emerged. Since then, there has been 
an ongoing discussion of how to create an effective corporate governance system. The 
literature suggests that both banks and the capital market can be effective in corporate 
control as they are able to resolve the problem of information asymmetries between 
financiers and managers.  
However, in a transition economy bank-based corporate governance system 
seems to be more plausible than market-based given the fact that banking sector is far 
more developed than capital market. The latter is emerging very slowly as well as 
institutions that support it. Nevertheless, most commentators favor the market based 
corporate governance. The major focus of the discussions has been placed on 
strengthening minority shareholder rights, improving the workings of supervisory 
boards, and building the market for corporate control in order to create an American 
type corporate governance system.  
In the most advanced transition economies an enormous progress in reforming 
banking sector has been made due to restructuring of non-performing loans and wide 
range privatization, as well as restoring credibility of bankruptcy threat, when the 
borrower is not repaying debts. Hence, there are sufficient institutional requirements for 
banks to fill the gap in corporate governance after the state withdrawal. While 
operating under an effective corporate control mechanism in the form of credit, private 
firms can have better access to external financing, and hence economy can grow. 
Nevertheless, the role of banks has not been much emphasized in corporate governance 
reform in the post-communist countries. 
In the literature is stressed that bank’s involvement in corporate financing, and 
hence governance can be particularly advantageous for emerging market economies, 
where markets and firms are smaller, when legal protection is weaker and when there is 
less transparency than in developed market economies (Rajan and Zingales, 2003).  
Banks play an important role in corporate control since, as creditors, they have 
access to insider information on their debtors.  The closer relationship with their 
corporate client bank maintains, the more successful he is in reducing information 
asymmetries between himself and the borrower. In consequence, firms with a close 
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relationship with banks tend to be less financially constrained in their investment 
activities than firms without bank ties. 
Information asymmetries are central to the role of banks in corporate 
governance. It is grounded in Akerlof’s argument that a creditor is unable to judge the 
quality3 of an investment project that needs to be financed. He only knows the 
percentage of sound and unsound firms (“lemons”) on the market, but information on 
a single borrower is unavailable. Hence, he demands risk premium from all firms. That 
may act as a deterrent to borrowing for firms with good prospects. As a consequence, 
a relatively higher number of unsound firms than sound firms are seeking external 
financing. Thus, high premium incorporated in the price of credit – interest rate – 
influences not only demand for capital, but also the risk inherent in different classes of 
borrowers. Bank loan contract with high interest rate, which means higher profit for a 
lender, can cause “selecting” only borrowers with poor prospects. As a result of the 
adverse selection, a financier deprives firms with good investment prospects of 
opportunities to gain and trigger inefficient allocation of resources.  
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) point out that lenders are aware of the problem of 
adverse selection and hence, they tend to limit the quantity of loans at any particular 
rate. Thus, information asymmetries hinder access to external debt even in market 
equilibrium and this leads to credit rationing. In this situation external financing may 
not be available to the borrowers, who are willing to pay the market rate. Then, firm 
investments depend on availability of internal capital.  
Information asymmetries problem, that is essential element of imperfection in 
financial markets, makes not only the cost of external financing higher than internal 
one, but also leads to hierarchy of financing sources. The hierarchy is named a 
”pecking order” (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Firm’s managers are assumed to have full 
information about the value of the firm’s existing assets and investment projects. In 
contrast, external suppliers of funds are not capable to assess the quality of the credited 
firm. Therefore, they ask for a premium to offset losses that may arise from funding the 
lemons. In consequence, managers prefer less expensive internal capital to external 
financing. 
Diamond (1984) argues that a bank-creditor is capable of lessening information 
asymmetries, thus benefiting not only lender, but also borrower through reducing both 
                                                 
3 Any project may be of good quality if it has positive net present value. 
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credit rationing and the cost of external financing.4 Bank monitoring activities 
concentrate on collecting information that is most of the time not available to other 
stakeholders. While obtaining firm-specific information they enjoy economies of scale 
(the cost of gathering information decreases by repeating procedures with different 
creditor customers) and scope (banks can make the most of acquired information 
delivering different services to the same client). 
Empirical literature confirms that credit contract allows for an efficient 
monitoring of corporate borrowers, reducing information asymmetries. As a 
consequence, firms that maintain a close relationship with banks tend to be less 
financially constrained in their business activities than firms without such ties. For 
example, Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) find that large Japanese corporations 
that have close financial ties to large banks, that serve as their primary source of 
external finance, face lesser financial constrains than firms without such a relationship 
with banks. Using data on the same group of firms for a later period of time, when 
liberalization of financial markets in Japan occurred, McGuire (2003) shows that 
difference in financial constraints between the two groups of firms is much smaller 
since access to other than bank loans sources of external financing (bonds) becomes 
available. Elston (1996) and Harm (1996) reveal similar results for German large 
corporations as well as Van Eas and Garretsen for Dutch large companies. However, 
Fohlin (1998) reports using data on German firms for the period 1905-1913 that the 
link between financial constraints and close relationship with banks is unstable. 
According to Houston and James (2001) the access to bank financing for US firms 
depends on the size of planned investments. In US several formal laws such as 
equitable subordination and lender liability limit bank’s involvement in corporate 
financing, and hence governance. Their findings suggest that the role of banks in 
corporate control is determined by the institutional settings.  
In transition economies a close relationship with banks could be very 
advantageous for corporate sector given rather scare internal capital accumulation in 
corporate sector and difficulties with obtaining external financing. Better access to 
financial resources facilitates firm’s investment, and hence economic growth. Despite 
                                                 
4 Some authors point out that close relationship with banks may generate lender’s rent extraction from 
the borrower, because the latter is informationally captured by the former and, hence, not necessarily 
bring about the previously envisaged reduction in credit constraints for borrowers (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 
1992). The empirical evidence is mixed. See Weinstein and Yafeh (1999) for empirical evidence in Japan 
and Elsas and Krahnen for Germany (1998). 
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of that there is little empirical evidence on the effect of bank-firm relationship on firm’s 
financial constraints. Most studies were conducted for developed countries. Few papers 
are available on Korea5. This study is the first to address the issue for transition 
countries based on the example of Poland.  
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. Next section (section two) 
analyzes how the role of banks in corporate control evolved along with institutional 
transformation of a post-socialist economy. In the third section research methodology is 
explained. Fourth section covers data description. Fifth section discusses empirical 
results and selectivity bias. In the last one conclusions and future research agenda are 
presented.  
 
2. How institutions matter for bank’s involvement in corporate control?  
 
The purpose of this section is to provide a brief description how credit was 
becoming a mechanism of corporate control during transition process from a centrally 
planned economy to a market economy. In Poland, similarly to other socialist countries, 
banks played a significant role in corporate financing and thus governance already in a 
pre-transition period. Capital market was nonexistent and hence banks were sole 
providers of external financing to corporate sector. State enterprises could only apply 
for credit in one bank that was appointed to control their expenditures. It aimed to 
abolish interbank competition for business. There were generally no fixed limits on the 
amount of credit that was available for state enterprises, which hence were not capable 
of going bankrupt. The phenomena was described in details by Kornai (1980) and 
named by him as a soft budget constraint. Banks operated rather as cashiers than 
financial intermediaries distinctive for market economies. This was a consequence of 
distributing credit according to the provisions of the central plan rather than to the 
criteria of financial viability. In other words, banks were not profit maximization-
oriented entities and hence did not assure themselves loans repayment and return on 
their investment in the form of interests. Running under a soft budget constraint state 
enterprises were prone to overinvest. This created a situation, where a bank-firm 
relationship did not have the same raison d’etre as in a market economy.  
                                                 
5 Ferri G., Kang T., Kim I. (2001), Bae K., Kang K., Lim C. (2002b), Kim Y., Park K., Ratti R., Shin H. 
(2002). 
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When socialist economic system collapsed, transition process began with 
markets and prices’ liberalization; among others interest rate deregulation. The cost of 
credit increased sharply and state enterprises faced enormous difficulties to repay a 
huge burden of loans inherited from the centrally-planned economic regime. In addition 
price and foreign trade liberalization weakened the competitiveness of their products. 
The difficult market conditions forced some state enterprises to adjust by cuts in 
production that was hard to sell, and suspend investment projects. (Belka and 
Krajewski, 1997). 
Along with liberalization and stabilization process institutional transformation 
began. The mono-bank was transformed into two-tier banking system and capital 
market started to emerge. On the threshold of transition bank loans were more 
important source of external financing than equity capital for enterprises, since the 
latter was scarce and came mainly from FDI6. Due to underdeveloped capital market 
banks had to maintain their function as main finance providers to firms. Inexperienced 
in applying market criteria to their lending decisions they continued to serve their 
corporate clients they had a relationship in pre-transition period. The concept of 
creditworthiness was immensely difficult to implement given that state enterprises had 
no “proven track record”, rapid systemic change was already in place as well as there 
was lack of human resources skilled at assessing borrower financial situation. 
Moreover, an increase in credit cost caused that state enterprises in a good standing 
ceased financing with bank loans. Only those state enterprises that were in the difficult 
financial situation tended to finance themselves with credit (Gomulka, 1993).  That led 
to highly concentrated banks’ loan portfolios and ultimately to a severe problem of bad 
debts. 
Given the magnitude of bad debts in banking sector a fundamental bank and 
enterprise restructuring program was indispensable. The main aim of the program was 
to stabilize the commercial banking sector by resolving of the problem of non-
performing loans. It was related with two other goals. First, credit should go to firms 
that are able to make payments on existing debts and have perspectives to further 
develop. Second, banks should have incentives to monitor corporate clients in order to 
assure themselves credit repayment and return on their investment in the form of 
interests.  
                                                 
6 See Transition Report 1998: Financial sector in transition, EBRD, 1998. 
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In Poland the enterprise and bank restructuring program commenced in 1993 
and lasted until 1996. There were nine state banks involved, whose main tasks were to 
establish workout departments, staff them adequately and take action to recover loans 
qualified as doubtful or loss. The program provided banks with three new tools to deal 
with non-performing loans: bank-led conciliation agreement, public sale of banks debts 
on the secondary markets, and possibility to swap their bad loans for shares of 
privatizing companies. The two last tools had limited effects. First, secondary markets 
for debt were very small because there was lack of capital in the whole economy. 
Second, according to the Banking Law (inspired by European Union Second Banking 
Directives) banks were allowed to hold certain limited amount of debtors’ shares.7   
As far as the first tool is concerned banks were to monitor the conciliation 
agreement they led, and were liable for any additional losses to others creditors, if the 
agreement conditions were not fulfilled by debtors8. Hence, they had incentives to 
insist upon financial restructuring as well as upon fundamental changes in the size or in 
debtor activities. The bank-led conciliation agreement enabled to impose on firms a 
hard budget constraint, build institutional capacity for resolution of financial distress. 
Besides it was free of fraud or corruption. But on the other hand it also resulted in a 
short-term banks’ involvement in debtor’ control. After the restructuring program came 
to the end banks decided to strictly restrict the amount of credit granted to corporate 
sector and hence their role in corporate control diminished considerably (Pawłowicz, 
1996). The inherited from the centrally planned economy a bank-firm relationship has 
been loosened and ultimately firm’s financial constraints have occurred (Konings, 
Rizov, Vandenbussche, 2002). 
In the hindsight, the bank and enterprise restructuring program in Poland was 
successful. The main factor in its success was getting banks involved in activities that 
were to improve their loan portfolio. The fundamental bank incentives embraced the 
short-term binding restructuring act, opportunity of recapitalization and better 
protection of the creditors rights. In addition, the program contributed to introducing 
new mechanisms of corporate governance (e.g. debtor’s equity holdings) and to re-
establishing effectiveness of formally functioning mechanisms of corporate governance  
(e.g. credible threat of insolvency procedures).  
                                                 
7 The law says that bank shareholding in one corporate equity can not exceed 15% of own equity. 
8 Similarity to the legal rule of loan subordination in US 
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Although the bank restructuring process was very important for creating 
institutional settings for using credit as a corporate control device, privatization 
(understood as reducing state ownership in the banking sector as well as creating new 
private banks) was a milestone. It enabled banks to transform their function from a 
passive cashier to an active financial intermediation that is interested in debtor’s control 
in order to get credit repaid. With this regard competition from foreign banks played 
a great role. Their presence on the Polish market for financial services contributed to 
a sharp increase in interbank competition, and later at the end of 1990s to a reinforcing 
consolidation process in banking sector.  As a consequence, diversification of bank 
loan portfolio has been decreased and hence, credit risk has risen. That is another 
important incentive for banks to get involved in corporate control by establishing 
a close relationship with their debtors. 
The last step on the way to establish necessary conditions for banks to get 
involved in corporate governance was improvement in protection of creditor rights. 
A great effort has been made recently to reform insolvency and collateral laws in order 
to restore credibility of bankruptcy threat.9 The results are mixed as the laws are very 
efficient in books, however still the enforcement is rather weak [EBRD, Transition 
Report 2003]. 
 
3. Methodology  
 
In this paper I examine the effects of bank’s involvement in corporate control on 
firm’s financial constraints in a transition economy based on the example of Poland. 
Specifically, I empirically investigate whether firms with a close relationship with 
banks are less financially constrained in comparison to the firms without such ties. 
Firm’s financial constraints are measured by cash flow sensitivity of investment [see 
Fazzari, Hubbard, Petersen 1988].  
In this methodology firms are divided into subsamples based on the criteria, 
which identify a priori the firms that face financial constraints. I use as a criterion a 
close relationship with banks. Typically in the recent studies duration of firm-bank 
relationship or a number of creditors are perceived as evidence of close ties with banks.  
                                                 
9 There is new bankruptcy law since 2003, which strengthens creditor rights. 
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In this paper I use placement of bankers on firm’s supervisory board as a proxy 
of firm-bank relationship for the two following reasons. First, institutional reforms in 
banking sector in Poland caused breaking off credit connections between banks and 
enterprises imposed upon them within monobank system in the centrally-planned 
economy. A great number of new private banks have begun to operate in Poland since 
transition started. It increased enormously competition and then consolidation process 
in the Polish banking sector. As a consequence, firms may be constantly inclined to 
resign from existing bank relationship and encouraged to look for new lenders.  
Second, given severe information asymmetries typical for a transition economy 
maintaining close credit relationship may not be sufficient for banks to monitor 
borrowers. With a banker on the firm supervisory board they can have more extensive 
knowledge about debtor’s financial situation. 
Having two subsamples: firms with at least one banker on the board and firms 
without bank representatives on the board, I look at the cash flow-investment 
sensitivity. Strong and positive correlation between internally generated funds and 
investment indicates the capital market imperfection – information asymmetries. This 
creates preference for cheaper internal capital over more expensive external capital. 
Firms that find it relatively more costly to rise external financing will demonstrate a 
greater investment-cash flow sensitivity. When bank dependent firms appear 
significantly less investment-cash flow sensitive than firms without personal bank ties, 
it may be interpreted as evidence that a close relationship with creditor lowers the cost 
of external financing. It will be consistent with the theory that bank’s involvement in 
corporate control through sitting on firm supervisory boards diminishes information 
asymmetries between himself and borrower. 
The equation looks like this: 
Iit/Ki(t-1) =  α0+ α1 CF it/Ki(t-1) + α2 Q it +  α3 X it /K i(t-1) + ε itt, 
 
where I denotes investment spending in fix assets of the ith firm in t time. Investment (I) 
is a dependent variable and is calculated as the first difference of gross fixed assets 
expenditures. Fixed assets include land, property, plant, equipment and patents.   
There are two explanatory variables: Tobin Q and cash flow (CF). X controls 
for other variables that can determine the size of investment expenditures. The first 
explanatory variable represents future growth investment opportunities, which is 
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proxied by market-to-book ratio. The second variable, cash flow (CF), is measured as 
net income plus non-cash costs (e.g. depreciation) minus non cash expenditure. Hence, 
it is represented by cash flow from operating activities.  
S. Fazzarii and others (1988) point out that in a world with complete 
information about capital market, investment expenditures would depend only on 
profitability of the firm’s investment opportunities. Then as F. Modigliani i M. Miller 
(1958) argue investment could be financed by any combination of internal and external 
capital. However, in the real world there is always some degree of information 
asymmetries between a financier and a firm. It leads to a situation when the cost of 
external capital is higher than internal one.  This can significantly reduce firm’s 
investment activities, which then are restricted by the amount of cash flow generated 
internally.  
Recent empirical work suggests that it is necessary to include on the right hand 
side of the equation an interaction term (CF/Kt-1 *Neg) indicating negative cash flow 
observations.  Neg is a dummy variable equals 1, if firm’s cash flow is negative, or 0 
otherwise. Allayanis and Mozumdar (2001) find that firms with negative cash flow 
have driven investment down to its lowest possible level, making it unable to respond 
to further reduction in cash flow. This reduces the investment-cash flow sensitivity for 
these observations.  
In the above equation I added several control variables to determine the 
robustness of my results. They are defined as follows. I include production to control 
for a potential accelarator effect. High level of production may lead to increase capacity 
in the future, hence more fix assets investment expenditures are necessary. I use 
revenue from sales (S) as the proxy for production (Abel and Blanchard, 1986). 
I also include a few variables that denotes sources of external capital: long-term 
and short-term bank loans (respectively: LBL and SBL) as well as other long-term and 
short-term liabilities (correspondingly OLL and OSL). Separating bank loans from 
other liabilities aims to identify the impact of availability of credit on investment 
activities. Severe credit rationing may lead to an increase of other liabilities in 
financing fix assets investments. According to Weller (2001) positive and significant 
relationship between different variables of external capital and investment expenditures 
in a transition country indicates that firms operate under a hard budget constraint. 
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To avoid heteroskedasticity all variables in the model are normalized by the 
stock of fixed assets at the beginning of the period – K(t-1).  
Further I add to the equation a dummy variable (BH) that shows the impact of 
bank’s equity holding on firm’s investment. It equals 1, if there is at least one bank 
among firm’s shareholders, 0 otherwise. 
In order to control for possibilities to acquire external financing for investments 
from large block shareholders I include a variable indicating concentration of firm 
ownership structure (OC). It can take values from 1 – the most concentrated firm 
ownership structure to do 5 – the lowest level of concentration.10 Finally, to weed out 
macro shocks I add a yearly dummies. 
 
4. Data  
 
The sample I analyze is a set of all non-financial companies that have been 
continuously listed on the Polish stock exchange between 1999 and 2002. The 
timeframe, for which data was collected, enables to examine the effect of bank’s 
involvement in corporate control on firm’s financial constraints during economic 
downturn and upturn11. The year 1999 represents economic boom as then GDP grew 
annually by 4,1%. This year together with the first quarter of the year 2000 was also 
considered to be the most profitable period for the companies listed in Poland. Later the 
economic growth significantly slowed down. And eventually, year 2001 brought 
recession - the worst rate of GDP growth in transition period equaled 1%.12
                                                 
10 When the variable OC is set as 1 then it means that single shareholder holds more than 75%. If two or 
three shareholders hold more than 75% than the variable is equal 2. Concentration is set as 3 when the 
single shareholder holds more 50% and relatively 4 if two or three shareholders hold more than 50%. 
Concentration is considered to be 5 in all the cases in which the concentration is more dispersed than 
50%.  
11  The literature points out that credit plays a different and in some ways complementary role to equity. 
Debtholders are viewed as more risk-averse than shareholders, because they do not share in upside gains. 
And thus bank’s involvement in corporate governance is desirable during an economic downturn ("bad 
times"), when tight controls on spending and investment is needed, particularly in times of financial 
distress or during restructuring. See more Baer and Gray, 1996. 
12 The Polish economy grew very quickly in the second half of 90s. Since 1999 it has begun to slow 
down. However, in 2002 the growth was already signaling a probable recover from recession (1,4%), See 
EBRD, Transition Report 2003, 2004. 
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I restrict my sample to publicly traded companies for three interrelated reasons. 
First, data on listed companies is widely disclosed and reliable13. Second, these firms 
are large and hence external financing and corporate governance is of great importance 
for them. Third, the evidence suggests that firms in Poland operate under severe credit 
rationing, while financing needs in a transition economy are high (Weller, 2001). 
However, it is likely that public companies have better access to bank loans than other 
business entities as they are in better standing.  
Public companies are considered to be well performing corporations in Poland, 
as the listing requirements are very stringent. Most of them also represent the largest 
firms in Poland. Their equities are listed on three different markets: main, parallel and 
free. The category of the market, on which a firm is listed, is determined by its book 
value. The minimum book value of a company is different for each market and it equals 
65 millions PLN, 22 millions PLN, 4 millions PLN14 respectively. Given the values 
listed companies are considered to be large or middle-size. Disclosure rules are the 
same for all issuers regardless of the market, on which they are listed.  
At the beginning of the sample selection process I distinguished 18215 non-
financial companies that were listed on the Polish stock exchange at the end of the year 
1999. They represented various industries and service sectors.16 Most of firms (57%) in 
the sample belonged to industry; 20% out of it produced food, 19% chemicals and 18% 
electro-machinery. 20% of firms represented construction sector and 22% focused on 
different services.  
Over time, 34 firms dropped from the sample for the following reasons: 
financial distress and ultimately bankruptcy (13), transactions that took firms private17 
(17) and mergers (4). Additional 6 firms were also excluded, because a complete set of 
the data regarding composition of the supervisory boards was unavailable. Over all I 
possess data on 568 firm-year.18  
                                                 
13 Since the year 1999 information disclosure proceedings for companies listed in Poland are very closely 
monitored. The reason is that the Law on the Public Trading of Securities date as of 21 August 1997, 
obliges public companies to deliver all information relevant to investors’ decisions, came into force. 
14 In the period 1999-2002 the Polish currency exchange rate was fairly stable, approximately 1$ to 4 
PLN. 
15 At the end of the year 1999 there were 221 companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. I exclude 
from this group 15 NFIs and 24 financial enterprises.  
16 For details see appendix 1. 
17 It is usually decision taken by foreign strategic investors. 
18 Since the sample contains firms with continuous data only, there might be a selectivity bias in the 
sample. However, in terms of results there should be no change in investment sensitivity to cash flow, 
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Given the two-tier structure of board of directors in Poland, there are two ways, 
in which a firm might have a bank representative on the supervisory board. First, 
banks’ management team members can sit on the firm’s supervisory board. Second, 
when the same individual is a member of bank and firm supervisory board. The first 
case was much more common in my sample. 86% of all bank representatives on firm 
supervisory board were bank managers.  
Placement of bankers on firm supervisory board was common way of 
maintaining relationship with banks among listed companies. 49% of sample firms had 
at least one banker on the supervisory board during the years 1999-2002.19 Most of the 
time firms with such bank ties reported about one bank representative on their 
supervisory boards (75% of all observations). 21% of all observations concern 
situation, when a firm had two bankers on the board. Very rarely firms informed about 
three bank representatives (4% of all observations). 
The largest banks in Poland20 were the most active in developing relationship 
with their corporate clients by delegating their representatives to firm supervisory 
board. 67% of bankers on the supervisory board represented the six largest banks in 
Poland21. Those banks were also the largest creditors of the listed companies. Long-
term loans granted to the sample firms by the six largest banks added up to 64% of all 
long-term credit delivered to all sample firms.   
It was rather unusual to see a representative of one of the foreign banks 
operating in Poland on the firm supervisory board - (8% of all bankers). Long-term 
loans from these banks amounted to less than 1% of all long-term credit provided to the 
sample firms.  
Having a bank representative on the board did not always indicate that firm was 
financed with credit. Sometimes banks placed their delegates on firm supervisory board 
in spite of that they were neither its creditors nor shareholders. 39% of sample firms 
                                                                                                                                              
because both good firms (those that were taken private) and bad firms (those that went bankrupt) were 
excluded from the sample. 
19 Supervisory board’s composition should be revealed in the annual financial reports. Any changes 
should be announced publicly by sending a current report to the Polish Securities and Exchange 
Commission. Each current report show employment records of new board members.  
20 They were previously state banks, but now they are joint-stock companies, where block shares are in 
hands of foreign banks. 
21 At that time those were: PKOBP, PEKAO, BPHPBK, CITI BANK HANDLOWY, ING BANK 
ŚLĄSKI, BRE. 
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had at least one bank-creditor delegate on their supervisory boards at least once during 
the years 1999-2002.  
Table 1. shows some relevant statistics22 for the two sets of firms: with and 
without bankers on the supervisory board. The subscript BT refers to firms that had 
a bank delegate on their supervisory boards at least once during 1999-2002. The 
subscript NBT stands for firms that did not have at all bank board representation during 
1999-2002. The two types of firms differ significantly taking into account the following 
variables: cash flow, long-term and short-term bank loans, long-term other liabilities 
and size of firms (measured by natural log from the total assets).  
Similar results I obtained by comparing two different sets of firms: with and 
without a bank-creditor representative on their supervisory boards. The subscript BCT 
refers to firms that had a bank-creditor delegate on their supervisory boards at least 
once during 1999-2002, and the subscript NBCT stands for firms that did not have at 
all bank-creditor representation on the supervisory board during 1999-2002. 
Table 1.  Summary statistics comparing firms with bank ties and firms without bank ties. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BT NBT Difference BCT BNCT Difference
Mean I/K 0.216 0.226 0.165 0.260 0.198 0.948
Median  I/K 0.077 0.098 0.857 0.079 0.088 0.093
Mean CF/K 0.148 0.250 3.159*** 0.144 0.234 2.684***
Median  CF/K 0.133 0.184 3.513*** 0.124 0.175 3.477***
Mean Q 1.130 1.104 0.380 1.161 1.090 1.009
Median  Q 0.970 0.931 1.687* 0.979 0.922 2.596***
Mean S/K 5.282 5.172 0.098 6.001 4.764 1.067
Median  S/K 2.876 2.930 1.604 3.190 2.852 0.152
Mean LBL/K 0.116 0.095 1.326 0.138 0.086 3.146***
Median  LBL/K 0.040 0.000 2.869*** 0.050 0.000 3.969***
Mean SBL/K 0.353 0.274 1.853** 0.407 0.257 3.426***
Median  SBL/K 0.217 0.173 2.705*** 0.258 0.162 4.38***
Mean OLL/K 0.098 0.064 2.134** 0.112 0.061 3.145***
Median OLL/K 0.018 0.006 1.458 0.022 0.006 2.696***
Mean OSL/K 1.242 1.189 0.183 1.430 1.086 1.144
Median OSL/K 0.596 0.579 0.161 0.667 0.564 1.714*
Mean ln size of total 
assets 12.205 11.850 3.123*** 12.319 11.846 4.05***
Median ln size of total 
assets 11.903 11.791 2.023** 11.960 11.832 2.75***
* coefficient significant at 10% or better 
** coefficient significant at 5% or better 
*** coefficient significant at 1% or better 
                                                 
22 For more detailed summary statistics see appendix 2. 
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One might be tempted to use statistics to support the hypothesis that firms 
appreciate relationship with banks the most being in financial distress. The largest 
amount of bank loans went to firms with bankers on the boards that informed about 
negative cash flow from operating activities. This is a symptom of different state of 
financial distress such as: temporary financial distress, severe financial distress or 
insolvency.23 In my sample most of the firms were in temporal financial distress since 
they report negative cash flow just once or twice during the years 1999-2002. Only 3 
out of 77 firms informed about financial distress for three years in a row.24  
 
5. Regression results   
 
Table 2. reports regression results separately for the two sets of firms: with (BT) 
and without a bank representative on the supervisory board (NBT).    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 Firms can also suffer from negative cash flow at the early stage of growth. This variant is not 
applicable to my sample, as it comprises of listed companies that are considered to be established firms.  
24  See appendix 3, which provides summary statistics separating the group of firms with positive cash 
flow from the group of firms with negative cash flow. 
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Table 2. Fixed effects regression relating investment to cash flow for firms with a banker on the 
supervisory board (BT) and for firms without bankers on the supervisory board (NBT). 
The dependent variable, fixed capital investment I, is regressed on cash flow  - CF, market-to-book ratio- 
Q, income from sales, negative cash flow - CF*Neg (where Neg is a dummy variable equals 1, when 
cash flow is negative, 0 otherwise), long-term - LBL and short-term - SBL bank loans, other long-term - 
OLL and short-term liabilities - OSL, a dummy for bank equity holdings - BH, ownership concentration 
dummies from 1 to 5 - OC, annual variable indicators (t2, t3, t4). Level variables are normalized by fixed 
capital at the beginning of the year - K(t-1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 2 3
CF/Kt-1 0,65** 0,37** 0,707*** 0,533***
Q 0,01 -0,01 0,413*** 0,461***
S/Kt-1 0,006 (-0,07)*** 0,033*** -0,005
CF/Kt-1*Neg (-1.47)** -0,15 (-1,8)*** (-1,2)***
LBL/Kt-1 1,42*** 0,885***
SBL/Kt-1 1,47*** 0,302***
OLL/Kt-1 0,51*** -0,052
OSL/Kt-1 0,18*** 0,1609***
BH 0,016 0,182*
CO_1 -0,036 0,161
CO_2 (-0,61)** 0,472
CO_3 -0,074 0,277
CO_4 -0,126 0,271
CO_5 NA 0,486
T2 (-0.358)*** (-0,28)*** 0,083 0,025
T3 (-0.45)*** (-0,49)*** -0.009 -0,045
T4 (-0.477)*** (-0,44)*** -0,286 -0,013
Constant 0.344*** 0,002 (-0.658)*** (-1,06)***
p-value (F) 0,4 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hausman test 0,9 0,13 0.00 0.00
R2 within            0.14 0,64 0,63 0,71
R2 between        0.11 0,14 0,41 0,39
R2 overall 0.13 0,39 0,52 0,54
N 276 276 292 292
BT NBT
4
 
* coefficient significant at 10% or better 
** coefficient significant at 5% or better 
*** coefficient significant at 1% or better 
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The first and third columns of table 2. show the results for the simple 
investment regression equation.  Investment of firms with a banker on the supervisory 
board was less sensitive to cash flow than investment of firms without bank 
representatives on the board. The second and fourth columns present results from an 
extended regression equation. The difference in investment-cash flow sensitivity 
between the two sets of firms increased. Again, internal capital was less important 
source of financing for firms with personal bank ties than for firms without such ties, 
because the former were less financially constrained than the latter. 
I also find that investment of both sets of firms was positively and significantly 
related to the level of bank financing both long-term and short-term.  However, the 
estimated coefficient of the variable indicating long-term bank loans was twice as large 
for firms with bankers on the board than for firms without bank representatives on the 
board. In case of short-term bank loans estimated coefficient was also much larger for 
firms with personal bank ties than for firms without such ties – five times as large. It 
suggests that bank financing was far more important for firms with a banker on the 
board than for firms without bank board representation. 
Besides the results reveal that for firms with a banker on their supervisory 
boards the coefficients of both long-term and short-term bank loans were nearly five 
times larger than coefficient of cash flow. It may be interpreted as evidence that for 
those firms bank loans were more important for investment financing than internal 
capital.  
In contrast, for firms with no bank representatives on the board estimated 
coefficient of cash flow was twice as large as estimated coefficient of short-term bank 
loans. Thus, for this set of firms internal capital was more significant than short-term 
bank loans for investment financing. However, estimated coefficient of long-term bank 
loans was larger than estimated coefficient of cash flow. Given that more than 50% of 
the firms did not receive long-term bank loans those results support the hypothesis that 
they were more financially constrained (see table 1). 
Note that production appeared to influence the investment activities of firms 
with personal bank ties. However, it may have very minor impact on investment 
spending. The estimated coefficient of income from sales was negative, but very close 
to zero.  
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The relation between investment spending and the level of investment 
opportunities – measured by the market-to-book ratio – was positive and statically 
significant just for firms without bank representatives on the boards. They were smaller 
– as the summary statistics show25 – than firms with bankers on the board and therefore 
were likely to have bigger incentives to invest and grow. 
For both sets of firms the estimated coefficient indicating other short-term 
liabilities were statistically significant, but its impact on investment spending was much 
smaller than bank loans. As far as other long-term liabilities are concerned their 
increase was related to a rise in investment expenditures, but just for firms with 
personal bank ties. It seems that other creditors may treat bank participation in board 
activities as mechanism that can assure themselves debt repayments.  
Ownership concentration was not statistically significant variable. Only in the 
case of firms with bankers on the board, whose 75% shares ware concentrated in hands 
of two or three shareholders, investment was negatively related to ownership 
concentration. It may indicate that the largest investors undertook a firm restructuring. 
However, assets stripping hypothesis cannot be rejected.  
I also included to the investment equation a variable that depicts bank equity 
holdings, because the role of bank as shareholders may be important for firm 
investment decisions. The effect of this variable was insignificant for firms that had a 
bank representative on the supervisory board. On the other hand for firms without 
bankers on the board it was positively and significantly related to investment 
expenditures. 
Last, but not least, investment expenditures are very much sensitive to macro 
environment. From the data we see that the economic downturn from 2000-2002 had a 
negative impact on investment activities. Firms with bankers on the board reacted 
quickly on a decline of economic growth by decreasing of the amount spent on 
investment. Macro situation had no impact on investment of firms without bankers on 
the board. 
 
As mentioned before most of bankers on the firm supervisory board represented 
the six largest banks in Poland. Those banks were also the main creditor of the sample 
companies during 1999-2002. Hence, it is worthwhile to examine whether placement of 
                                                 
25 See appendix 2. 
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management team member from one of the six largest banks in Poland on firm 
supervisory board affects investment-cash flow sensitivity. With this respect two 
interaction terms were included to the equation. One consisted of cash flow (CF) and a 
dummy variable for large banks, when a banker represented one of the six largest banks 
in Poland (LB): CF/Kt-1*LB. Respectively, there was also interaction term between 
cash flow (CF) and a dummy variable for smaller banks (SB) - CF/Kt-1*SB. 
Regression results26 show that cash flow was important for firms that 
maintained personal relationship with one of the largest banks in Poland. Estimated 
coefficient for cash flow for firms with bankers from one of the largest banks on the 
board was smaller than for firms without bank board representation. Hence, investment 
of the former group was less sensitive to cash flow than investment of the latter group. 
However, the difference in investment-cash flow sensitivity between these two sets of 
firms was smaller in comparison to the outcome of analyzed previously subgroups of 
firms: with and without bankers on the board. 
The relationship between interaction term CF/Kt-1*SB and investment was 
statistically insignificant. It may be a result of a small number of observations, when 
firms had bankers from smaller banks on the supervisory board. 
 
To investigate whether placement of a banker on the supervisory board indicates 
bank’s involvement in corporate governance I repeated all estimation, classifying firms 
into two sub-sample differently. First group (BCT) consisted of firms with 
a representative of a bank that at least once during the research period 1999-2002 was 
their creditor. Second group (NBCT) included firms without bank-creditor delegates on 
the firm supervisory board. 
Table 3. demonstrates that investment of firms with bank-creditor 
representatives on the board was almost as sensitive to cash flow as investment of firms 
without bank-creditor delegates on the board. The difference in investment-cash flow 
sensitivity between two distinguished sub-samples appeared to be very small. One 
interpretation may be that firms with bank-creditor representatives on the supervisory 
board faced similar financial constraints in their investment decisions as firms with no 
bank-creditor delegates on the board. It suggests that neither firms with bank-creditor 
representatives on the firm supervisory board have yet succeeded in mitigating 
                                                 
26 See appendix 4. 
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Table 3. Fixed effects regression relating investment to cash flow for firms with a bank-creditor 
representative on the supervisory board (BCT) and for firms without bank-creditor delegates on 
the supervisory board (NBCT). 
The dependent variable, fixed capital investment I, is regressed on cash flow  - CF, market-to-book ratio- 
Q, income from sales, negative cash flow - CF*Neg, where Neg is a dummy variable equals 1, when 
cash flow is negative, 0 otherwise), long-term - LBL and short-term - SBL bank loans, other long-term - 
OLL and short-term liabilities - OSL, a dummy for bank equity holdings - BH, ownership concentration 
dummies from 1 to 5 - OC, annual variable indicators (t2, t3, t4). Level variables are normalized by fixed 
capital at the beginning of the year - K(t-1).  
 
 
BCT NBCT
CF/Kt-1 0.5** 0.54***
Q -0.003 0.45***
S/Kt-1 -0.068 -0.007
CF/Kt-1*Neg -0.301 (-1.185)***
LBL/Kt-1 1.4*** (0.921)***
SBL/Kt-1 1.518*** (0.314)***
OLL/Kt-1 0.47** 0.153
OSL/Kt-1 0.152** (0.163)***
BH 0.063 0.168
CO_1 -0.027 0.161
CO_2 (-0.691)*** 0.394
CO_3 -0.133 0.224
CO_4 -0.084 0.201
CO_5
Brak 
obserwacji 0.350
T2 (-0.3)*** -0.019
T3 (-0.507)*** (-0.117)*
T4 (-0.487)*** -0.066
Constant -0.08 (-0.954)***
p-value (F) 0.00 0.00
Hausman test 0.00 0.00
R2 within            0.70 0.65
R2 between        0.10 0.35
R2 overall 0.42 0.48
N 212 356
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* coefficient significant at 10% or better 
** coefficient significant at 5% or better 
*** coefficient significant at 1% or better 
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asymmetric information between creditor and borrower. Nor, placement of a bank-
creditor representative on firm supervisory board is not an ideal measure of corporate 
control exercised by banks.  
Closer scrutiny of the results from table 2. and 3. reveals that investment-cash 
flow sensitivity of firms with a banker on the supervisory board increased after 
excluding from the first set 16 firms with bank delegates on the board that did not 
represent bank-creditor. Including those 16 firms to the subgroup where firms did not 
possess bank board representation did not impact their investment-cash flow sensitivity. 
Regression outcome just for those 16 firms shows that investment was not 
statistically related to the level of cash flow.  Additionally, neither other sorts of 
financing affected investment expenditures. One interpretation is that those 16 firms 
financed their investment from retained earnings or issuing corporate bonds. It is 
possible that those firms did not invest during 1999-2002 since mean of investment 
expenditures equals 0,068, and median respectively 0,056. 
Analyzing the results from table 2. and 3. one should note that after relocating 
16 firms from subgroup with bank ties to subgroup without bank ties estimated 
coefficient of other variables nearly did not change. 
 
Controlling for possible selection bias 
 
To control for selectivity bias that can arise at the firm level, I use the fixed 
effects estimation that takes care of the selection bias related to non-random exit from 
the sample. However, selectivity bias might not be related to firm’s identity 
characteristics. It may occur in the choice of a measure of bank’s involvement in 
corporate control, and then explains the difference in the investment-cash-flow 
sensitivity between firms with bankers on the board and firms without bank board 
representation. To cope with the problem I use, like in previous papers, the method 
described by Dubin and McFadden (1984). It involves first estimating logit model on 
the choice of bank representative to the firm supervisory board, and then using the 
predicted probability from the logit model as an exogenous variable in the investment 
equation.   
Table 3. presents the outcome of logit regression.  The relation between a 
dummy variable representing bank board representation and the following independent 
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variables: cash flow, firm’s size, dummy for bank equity holdings, ownership 
concentration and short-term bank loans as well as other long-term liabilities is 
significant.  
Negative estimated coefficient of cash flow indicates that the lower level of 
cash flow, the higher the probability of having bankers on the board. In other words, 
bank representatives sit on the supervisory boards of those firms that are likely to be in 
financial distress. 
Also the value of estimated coefficient of size of firm is negative. It means that 
probability of bank delegates’ appointment to the supervisory board increases with the 
size of firm.  
Bank board representation is determined by the possibility of voting itself into 
board, as direct shareholding is highly significant.  
 
Table 4. Logit estimates: firm characteristics associated with having a bank representative on 
firm’s supervisory boards. 
The dependent variable takes the value 1, when firms have bank representatives on firm supervisory 
board, otherwise 0. The independent variables encompass: fixed capital investment I, cash flow  - CF, 
market-to-book ratio- Q, income from sales, long-term - LBL and short-term - SBL bank loans, other 
long-term - OLL and short-term liabilities - OSL, a dummy for bank equity holdings - BH, ownership 
concentration dummies from 1 to 5 – OC. All the level variables are normalized by fixed capital at the 
beginning of the year - K(t-1). Lev is relation between the bank loans and all liabilities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I/Kt-1 0.024
LBL/Kt-1 0.166
SBL/Kt-1 0.445*
LEV 0.290
OLL/Kt-1 0.886*
OSL/Kt-1 -0.054
S/Kt-1 0.009
CF/Kt-1 (-0.993)***
Q -0.013
ln size of total assets (-0.079)***
CO 0.136**
BH 1.158***
 R2 0.485
N 568
* coefficient significant at 10% or better 
** coefficient significant at 5% or better 
*** coefficient significant at 1% or better 
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Besides, the more concentrated ownership, the higher probability of having 
bank board representation. It implies the conflict of interests between large shareholder 
and creditor. Banks may be afraid that large shareholder can undertake more risky 
project as it was agreed upon in credit contract. The higher risk, the higher return on 
investment for shareholders. Creditor receives an unvarying return on investment in the 
form of interest rate.   
Short-term bank loans and long-term other liabilities predict positively bank 
board representation. One interpretation is that bank representatives sit on the 
supervisory board of the firms that finance their activities with short-term credit. Also, 
banks tend to have their representatives in the firm supervisory board to oversee 
whether other creditors do not intend to satisfy their claims at the cost of banks. 
In contrast, investment expenditures, level of production and future profitability 
of firm’s investment do not offer positive predictions of bank board representation. It 
means that banks do not delegate their representatives to the supervisory board of firms 
that grow faster or have better investment perspectives.  
 
At the second stage of Dubina and McFaddena’s test I examine whether the 
characteristics, that predict bank board representation, are related to investment rate. 
I estimate the investment equation for two sets of firms using random effects model 
that includes predicted probabilities of bank board representation as an exogenous 
variable. The coefficient of the additional variable measures the correlation between 
unobserved firm effects and unobserved factors that affect likelihood of having bank 
representative on the firm supervisory board.  Hence, it indicates the significance and 
size of selectivity bias.  
The outcome of random effect regression27 for firms with banker on the board 
shows that effect of selectivity bias on investment-cash flow sensitivity is limited. The 
coefficient on the selectivity term is not statistically significant. As far as firms without 
bank board representation are concerned, the additional variable (the predicted 
probability from the logit model) has significant influence on the investment 
expenditures. After including this variable investment-cash flow sensitivity has 
increased. It suggests that selectivity bias causes underestimation of investment-cash 
flow sensitivity for firms without bank ties. 
                                                 
27 See appendix 5. 
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I also use the Dubin and McFadden test to control for selectivity bias when 
bank’s involvement in corporate control are measured by placement of a bank-creditor 
representative on firm supervisory board. Results of logit regression reveal (table 5.) 
that relation between variable representing bank-creditor board representation and the 
following independent variables: cash flow, firm’s size, dummy for bank equity 
holdings, short-term bank loans as well as other long-term liabilities is significant. Note 
that the same variables decide about the presence of bank delegates on firm supervisory 
board (see table 4.). 
Table 5. Logit estimates: firm characteristics associated with having a bank-creditor 
representative on firm supervisory board. 
The dependent variable takes the value 1, when firms have a bank-creditor representative on firm 
supervisory board, otherwise 0. The dependent variable takes the value 1, when firms have bank 
representatives on firm supervisory board, otherwise 0. The independent variables encompass: fixed 
capital investment I, cash flow  - CF, market-to-book ratio- Q, income from sales, long-term - LBL and 
short-term - SBL bank loans, other long-term - OLL and short-term liabilities - OSL, a dummy for bank 
equity holdings - BH, ownership concentration dummies from 1 to 5 – OC. All the level variables are 
normalized by fixed capital at the beginning of the year - K(t-1). Lev is relation between the bank loans 
and all liabilities.  
 
 I/Kt-1 0.0930
 LB
 SB
 LEV
 OS
 S/K
 CF/K
Q
 l
 CO
 
 
L/Kt-1 0.7700
L/Kt-1 0.568***
0.7440
OLL/Kt-1 1.457***
L/Kt-1 -0.0380
t-1 0.0083
t-1 (-1.01)***
0.0100
n size of total assets (-0.134)***
0.0700
BH 1.12***
 R2 0.485
N 568
* coefficient significant at 10% or better 
** coefficient significant at 5% or better 
*** coefficient significant at 1% or better 
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Results of random effects regression28 for firms with a bank-creditor delegate 
on the board show that relation between additional variable – predicted probability of 
bank-creditor board representation from logit regression – and investment expenditures 
is not statistically significant. It is interpreted that selectivity bias does not influence 
investment-cash flow sensitivity. However, for firms without bank-creditor 
representatives on the board investment is positively and significantly related to the 
predicted probability of bank-creditor board representation from logit regression. After 
including the additional variable to equation investment-cash flow sensitivity increased. 
It suggests that selectivity bias causes underestimation of investment-cash flow 
sensitivity for firms without bank-creditor board representation.  
Based on the results from Dubin and McFadden’s test one cannot demonstrate 
that bank board representation is an inadequate measure of bank’s involvement in 
corporate control.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
On the threshold of the transition process from plan to market in postcommunist 
countries some researchers suggested that banks were to play a dominant role in 
corporate governance given the underdeveloped equity market and the existing under a 
socialist regime close relationship between banks and state enterprises. However, due 
to overwhelming problems with bad debts and on-going privatization in 1990s there 
were hardly any evidences that banks got involved in corporate control (except from 
the Enterprise and Bank Restructuring Program in Poland)29.  
After more than a decade since transition process commenced the research 
outcome shows that banks in Poland have not yet managed to decrease information 
asymmetries between themselves and borrowers by delegating their representatives to 
debtor’s supervisory board. As a consequence, firms with a bank-creditor 
representative on their boards were as much financially constrained in their investment 
                                                 
28 See appendix 6. 
29 For more see Baer, H.L., Gray C.W.: Debt as a control device in transitional economies: The 
experiences of Hungary and Poland, [w:] Frydman R., Gray Ch., Rapaczyński A.: Corporate 
Governance in Central Europe and Russia, Budapest: Central European University Press, 1996, Gray C., 
Holle A.: Bank-led restructuring in Poland: An empirical look at the bank conciliation process, World 
Bank, Policy Research Department, working paper, 1996, No. 1650, Dittus P.: Bank reform and behavior 
in central Europe, “Journal of Comparative Economics” 19, 1994 
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behavior as firms without bank-creditor delegates on their boards. It may be seen as 
evidence that the role of banks in corporate governance in Poland is still limited.  
However, the empirical results also show that firms with a bank-creditor 
representative on their supervisory boards relied more heavily on bank loans than on 
internal capital in their investment activities. In contrast, firms without a bank-creditor 
representative on their supervisory boards financed to larger extent their investment 
with internal capital than bank loans. Hence, bank loans are more important source of 
financing for firms with bank ties than for firms without bank ties.  
My findings demonstrate that it is not clear whether banks exercise corporate 
control over their debtors in Poland, but the hypothesis cannot be rejected. Recent 
completion of institutional reforms in banking sector should enable to set in motion the 
benefits from a close bank-firm relationship. Hence, banks are likely to begin playing 
an important role in corporate governance in transition economies. 
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Appendix 1. Companies listed in Poland by sector   
 
Sector Number of companies  Number of companies  
in the sample     listed in 1999 
 
Industry   111     143 
Food     17     23 
Light industry   9     17 
Wood & paper   5     7 
Chemicals    16     17 
Building materials   7     9 
Construction    29     37 
Electro-engineering   15     20 
Metals    12     12 
Other     1     1 
 
Services     31     39 
Wholesale & retail   9     16 
IT    6     6 
Telecom    3     3 
Media     3     3 
Other     10     11 
 
Total      142     182 
 
   
 
Appendix 2.Summary statistics for a sample of 142 listed firms over the period 1999-2002 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
I/Kt-1 0.498 0.192 0.046 0.026 0.583 0.197 0.033 0.014 0.418 0.191 0.058 0.038
CF/Kt-1 0.279 0.194 0.216 0.164 0.202 0.170 0.200 0.159 0.352 0.232 0.231 0.179
Total bank loans/Kt-1 0.413 0.230 0.349 0.273 0.537 0.293 0.373 0.307 0.295 0.191 0.326 0.217
LBL/Kt-1 0.110 0.003 0.075 0.001 0.131 0.047 0.086 0.025 0.090 0.000 0.065 0.000
SBL/Kt-1 0.303 0.142 0.274 0.180 0.407 0.143 0.287 0.202 0.205 0.129 0.261 0.155
Q 1.217 0.974 1.096 0.940 1.097 0.978 1.200 0.955 1.330 0.970 0.997 0.894
OLL/Kt-1 0.096 0.015 0.068 0.005 0.133 0.035 0.065 0.010 0.061 0.013 0.070 0.003
OSL/Kt-1 1.682 0.599 0.893 0.556 1.871 0.604 0.885 0.551 1.503 0.585 0.901 0.560
S/Kt-1 7.252 3.266 3.640 2.516 7.786 3.216 3.225 2.515 6.748 3.441 4.033 2.529
Total bank loans/ total liabilties 0.214 0.182 0.225 0.215 0.228 0.203 0.256 0.248 0.200 0.144 0.195 0.201
CO 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 3 4
Total assets (in mill PLN) 638,793 131,293 743,719 141,300 1,066,276 144,612 1,229,113 138,607 234,734 108,407 284,923 147,147
Number of observations
Dummy with value 1 for bankers on the board, 0 
otherwise 0.5 0 0.5 1.00 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Dummy with value 1 for bank shareholdings, 0 
otherwise 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dummy with value 1 for negative cash flow, 0 
otherwise 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
568 276 292
1999 2002 1999 2002 1999 2002
All firms BT NBT
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Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
I/Kt-1 0.591 0.246 -0.006 -0.012 0.545 0.286 0.070 0.024
CF/Kt-1 0.146 0.091 0.185 0.130 0.414 0.265 0.194 0.127
Total bank loans/Kt-1 0.667 0.389 0.471 0.427 0.314 0.177 0.407 0.309
LBL/Kt-1 0.164 0.064 0.090 0.014 0.073 0.000 0.079 0.000
SBL/Kt-1 0.503 0.254 0.381 0.328 0.242 0.129 0.327 0.209
Q 1.071 0.984 1.329 0.977 1.638 1.007 1.007 0.899
OLL/Kt-1 0.143 0.050 0.057 0.024 0.074 0.022 0.058 0.003
OSL/Kt-1 2.704 0.849 1.138 0.821 2.356 0.986 1.264 0.918
S/Kt-1 10.848 3.806 3.661 2.552 10.412 5.114 5.523 3.194
Total bank loans/ total liabilties 0.242 0.204 0.273 0.250 0.163 0.068 0.189 0.200
CO 4.35 5 3.9 4 3.59 4 3.30 4
Total assets (in mill PLN) 575,835       134,387   407,612    101,016   149,002    94,267     200,633    93,108       
Number of observations
Dummy with value 1 for bankers on the board, 0 
otherwise 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Dummy with value 1 for bank shareholdings, 0 
otherwise 0.48 0 0.55 1 0.14 0 0.19 0
Dummy with value 1 for negative cash flow, 0 
otherwise 0.38 0 0.15 0 0.27 0 0.27 0
Zmienne modelu
BT NBT
160 148
1999 2002 1999 2002
Appendix 3. Descriptive statistics for sample of firms with positive and negative cash flow splitted by bank ties 
 
 
   
 
Appendix 4. Fixed effects regression relating investment to cash flow for firms with banker on the 
supervisory board (BT) and for firms without bankers on the supervisory board (NBT). 
The dependent variable, fixed capital investment I, is regressed on interaction term (CF*LB) cash flow 
and dummy for the six largest banks in Poland, interaction term (CF*SB) cash flow and a dummy for the 
rest of banks, market-to-book ratio (Q),  income from sales, negative cash flow (CF*Negative, where 
Negative is dummy variable equals 1, when cash flow is negative, 0 otherwise), long-term (LB) and 
short-term (SB) bank loans, other long-term (OLL) and short-term liabilities (OSL), dummy for bank 
equity holding (BH), ownership concentration dummies from 1 to 5 (OC), annual variable indicators (t2, 
t3, t4). Level variables are normalized by fixed capital at the beginning of the year. 
 
CF/Kt-1*LB 0,46**
CF/Kt-*SB -0,001
Q -0,011
S/Kt-1 (-0,073)***
CF/Kt-1*Neg 0,106
LBL/Kt-1 1.395***
SBL/Kt-1 1.479***
OLL/Kt-1 0,465**
OSL/Kt-1 0,189***
BH 0,029
CO_1 -0,05
CO_2 (-0,638)***
CO_3 -0,095
CO_4 -0,165
CO_5 NA
T2 (-0,287)***
T3 (-0,506)***
T4 (-0,463)***
Constant 0,447
p-value (F) 0.00
Hausman test 0.00
R2 within            0,64
R2 between        0,15
R2 overall 0,4
N 276
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* coefficient significant at 10% or better 
** coefficient significant at 5% or better 
*** coefficient significant at 1% or better 
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Appendix 5. Random effects estimates of the investment equation for firms with banker on the 
supervisory board (BT) and for firms without bankers on the board (NBT). 
The dependent variable, fixed capital investment I, is regressed on cash flow  - CF, market-to-book ratio- 
Q, income from sales, negative cash flow - CF*Neg (where Neg is a dummy variable equals 1, when 
cash flow is negative, 0 otherwise), long-term - LBL and short-term - SBL bank loans, other long-term - 
OLL and short-term liabilities - OSL, a dummy for bank equity holdings - BH, ownership concentration 
dummies from 1 to 5 - OC, annual variable indicators (t2, t3, t4). Level variables are normalized by fixed 
capital at the beginning of the year - K(t-1). 
 
BT NBT
CF/Kt-1 0.10 1.6***
Q -0.04 0.286***
S/Kt-1 (-0.049)*** (-0.03)***
CF/Kt-1*Neg -0.15 -0.55
LBL/Kt-1 0.87*** 0.3*
SBL/Kt-1 1.304*** (-0.378)***
OLL/Kt-1 0.585*** (-0.93)***
OSL/Kt-1 0.105* 0.222***
BH 0.38 (-1.41)***
CO_1 -0.06 -0.13
CO_2 (-0.476)** -0.22
CO_3 -0.10 (-0.55)***
CO_4 -0.06 (-0.66)***
CO_5 NA -0.76
T2 (-0.291)*** 0.00
T3 (-0.484)*** -0.09
T4 (-0.47)*** -0.10
the predicted probability from the 
logit model 1.66 (-5.7)***
Constant -0.77 (-2.3)***
p-value (F) 0.00 0.00
Hausman test 0.60 0.73
R2 within            0.21 0.50
R2 between        0.43 0.64
R2 overall 276 292
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* coefficient significant at 10% or better 
** coefficient significant at 5% or better 
*** coefficient significant at 1% or better 
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Appendix 6. Random effects’ estimates of the investment equation for firms with a bank-creditor 
representative on the supervisory board (BCT) and for firms without bank-creditor representative on the 
board (NBCT). 
The dependent variable, fixed capital investment I, is regressed on cash flow  - CF, market-to-book ratio- 
Q, income from sales, negative cash flow - CF*Neg (where Neg is a dummy variable equals 1, when 
cash flow is negative, 0 otherwise), long-term - LBL and short-term - SBL bank loans, other long-term - 
OLL and short-term liabilities - OSL, a dummy for bank equity holdings - BH, ownership concentration 
dummies from 1 to 5 - OC, annual variable indicators (t2, t3, t4). Level variables are normalized by fixed 
capital at the beginning of the year - K(t-1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BCT NBCT
CF/Kt-1 0.53* 0.75***
Q -0.02 0.314***
S/Kt-1 (-0.049)*** -0.01
CF/Kt-1*Neg -0.25 -1.11
LBL/Kt-1 0.86*** 0.49***
SBL/Kt-1 1.22*** 0.11
OLL/Kt-1 0.39 -0.13
OSL/Kt-1 0.12 0.122***
BH -0.02 -0.14
CO_1 -0.10 -0.05
CO_2 (-0.62)** 0.07
CO_3 (-0.33)* 0.00
CO_4 -0.27 -0.04
CO_5 NA 0.07
T2 (-0.313)*** -0.02
T3 (-0.5)*** -0.15
T4 (-0.53)*** (-0.12)*
the predicted probability from the 
logit model 0.11 (-0.588)*
Constant 0.25 (-0.59)***
p-value (F) 0.00 0.00
Hausman test 0.67 0.64
R2 within            17.00 0.40
R2 between        0.46 0.52
R2 overall 212 356
 
 
* coefficient significant at 10% or better 
** coefficient significant at 5% or better 
*** coefficient significant at 1% or better 
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